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FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ*

Corporate Governance Part II-Accountahility Rulest
Corporate governance-the system by which companies are directed and controlled-involves the allocation of power and the
imposition of responsibility. Part I of the United States National Report on Corporate Governance dealt with the allocation of power by
examining the various institutions and rules which dictate who directs and controls companies. This part of the Report deals with the
imposition of responsibility by examining rules of accountability
under which those who control companies may become liable for the
decisions they make. 1
I.

A.

DuTIES

Directors' Duty of Care and Good Faith

Corporate directors in the United States have a duty of care. 2
The questions are how do courts measure whether directors breached
this duty, and to whom does the duty run. To answer these questions,
it is helpful to start by separating out two types of cases.
One common type of claim against directors for violating their
duty of care involves the allegation that the directors were inattentive while subordinates harmed the corporation. In these cases, so
long as there is no conscious decision by the board, courts generally
require directors to conform to the standard of a reasonably prudent
person in similar circumstances 3 -in other words, courts apply the
same basic standard used throughout the tort law of negligence. In
applying this test, liability depends upon the circumstances, such as
the presence of "red flags" which should have alerted the directors to
a problem, 4 and whether the directors made any effort to monitor, or
establish a system to monitor, what was going on. 5

* Distinguish ed Professor and Scholar, University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law; Director, Pacific McGeorge Global Center for Business & Development.
t DOl 10.5131/ajcl.2009.0023.
1. It should be noted that rules and institutions which allocate power also have
an accountability function insofar as the quality of decisions may impact the ability to
maintain power (for example by impacting prospects for a hostile takeover).
2. E.g. , Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30.
3. E.g., Francis v. United J er sey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
4. E.g. , In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S 'holders Litig., 293 F.3d 378 (7th Cir.
2002).
5. E.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 mel. 20061.
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Things change when the complaint is not that the directors were
inattentive, but, rather, that the directors made a poor, or arguably
poor, business decision. Such a complaint causes courts to turn to the
"business judgment rule."6 The idea underlying the rule is that courts
should exercise restraint in holding directors liable for (or otherwise
second-guessing) business decisions. Once courts in the United States
go beyond the general concept of judicial restraint, however, a lack of
consensus emerges as to exactly what the business judgment rule really is.
Many judicial expressions of the business judgment rule in the
United States simply state that corporate directors are not liable for
their decisions unless the plaintiff shows the directors were in a conflict of interest or failed to act with good faith and with reasonable
diligence. 7 This, however, is only stating that one who challenges a
decision of the board must show a breach of duty, which is hardly a
surprising proposition. The real question is whether the business
judgment rule changes what one must show to establish a breach of
duty. In some (older) court opinions, the answer is no, as they continue to apply concepts of ordinary negligence even in cases of
business decisions.8 The vast majority of courts in the United States,
however, view the business judgment rule as altering the standard
for imposing liability. At the most extreme, a few courts consider the
rule to command an approach under which directors are not liable for
a disinterested decision so long as they act in good faith. 9 This, however, is also an outlier view. Most courts are in the middle. For
example, the Delaware Supreme Court settled on the notion that the
business judgment rule embodies a standard of gross negligence.10
Another middle ground approach in the United States is to draw a
distinction between challenges based upon the substantive merits of
the directors' decision and challenges based upon the process the directors used to make the decision. The notion is that the business
judgment rule calls for less (or even no) judicial scrutiny of the merits
of the directors' decision, as opposed to the process the directors used
in arriving at the determination. 11
Regardless of the standard applied, it is rare for courts in the
United States to hold directors liable for a disinterested decision
under the business judgment rule. 12 Opinions differ as to whether
extending this exalted status to directors, as opposed to, say, doctors,
6.
7.
8.
9.
(1976).
10.
11.
(1979).
12.

E.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 lDel. 1984).
E.g., In re The Walt Dis ney no. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
E.g., Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
E.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 Misc. 2d 809, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807
E.g. , Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985l.
E.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 46 N.Y.2d 619, 394 N.E.2d 994. 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
E.g., Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384 mel. Ch. 1997).
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is justified.13 Yet, even this slight chance of liability has prompted
state legislatures to enact further protections for directors. In the
most common form, as illustrated by Section 102(b)(7) of the Dela ware General Corporation Law, these st atutes allow corporate
charters to contain provisions waiving damage claims against directors for breach of duty, except if the breach involves certain
categories of conduct. Among the categories of conduct not subject to
a liability waiver under Section 102(b) (7) are breaches of the duty of
loyalty, and, critically, acts not in good faith.
As a result, good faith effectively has become the standard for
disinterested conduct by directors for the numerous Delaware corporations whose certificat es contain the exculpatory provision allowed
by Section 102(b)(7). This, however, raises the question what is good
faith. Tradition ally, the answer seemingly focused on whether the directors believed their decision was in the best interest of the
corporation, 1 4 which, in turn, courts almost irrefutably presumed to
be the case in the absence of a conflict of interest. 15 Recent Delawar e
court decisions h ave left the door open to other interpret ations of
good faith. For example, in Disney, 16 the court stated that "an intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one's
responsibilities" could constitute a lack of good faith even in a case in
which there is no conflict of interest. As examples of such a dereliction (beyond just acting with a purpose other than to advance the
interests of the corporation) the court listed intentional violations of
law and intentional failures to act in the face of a known duty to act.
This means that even inattention can be in bad faith if the directors
knew they should have paid more att ention-which, in turn, courts
may infer from a sustained or systematic failure to exercise oversight, such as not even m aking an effort to establish a system to
monitor. 17
Finally, to whom do directors owe their duty of care and good
faith? The basic answer is to the corporation (as measured by profit
maximization) and its shareholders. 18 Courts in the United States
generally refuse to recognize an enforceable duty toward other stakeholders in the corporation, such as creditors, employees or the likewith a possible exception for creditors of insolvent corporations. 19 Indeed, courts have stated that directors might breach their duty by
sacrificing profit maximization and the interests of the sh areholder s
13. E.g. Franklin A. Gevurt:r., The Business ,Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage
or Misguided Notion? 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 287 (1994).
14. E.g., Stern v. General E lectric Co., 924 F.2d 472, 478 n. 8 (2d Cir. 1991).
15. E.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3rd Cir. 1980}.
16. In re The Walt Dis ney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006J.
17. E.g. , Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 mel. 2006).
18. E.g., Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
19. E.g. , North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v.
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007).
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in favor of creditors, employees and the like. 20 This, however, is bark
rather than bite. Application of the business judgment rule, reinforced in some states by statute, effectively leaves the balancing of
interests between shareholders and other corporate stakeholders
within the largely unchecked discretion of the board of directors. 21
B.

Directors' Duty of Loyalty

The directors' duty of loyalty typically arises in one of two contexts: taking for oneself an opportunity which the director should
have presented to the corporation, and, of far greater frequency and
importance to corporate governance, transactions in which directors
have a conflict of interest. On the former, suffice it to say that courts
have developed a variety of tests to determine when an opportunity
properly belongs to the corporation. 22
The approach to conflict of interest transactions in the United
States results from a blending of statutory provisions and judicial
doctrine. Under this approach, essentially, conflict of interest transactions are voidable unless at least one of three things occurs: (1)
approval by disinterested directors, (2) approval by the shareholders,
or (3) proof that the transaction is fair. 23 Application of this approach
raises issues both under the individual prongs and with respect its
disjunctive nature.
The one prong of this approach which most clearly can stand on
its own is proof that the transaction is fair. In other words, under
state corporate law in the United States, there is no requirement that
shareholders or disinterested directors approve a transaction entered
entirely on the authority of conflicted directors (or officers) if the
court concludes it is fair. 24 Proof of fairness involves issues of process
(particularly disclosure of material facts to any disinterested decision
makers 25 ) and substance (that the transaction serves a corporate
purpose 26 and that the terms are as good as the corporation would
have received when dealing with a stranger2 7 ) . Critically, the burden
of proof is on the conflicted directors, and, in marked distinction to
the deference shown to disinterested decisions under the business
20. E.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N .W. 668 (1919).
21. E.g. , Franklin A. Gevurtz, Shareholders Democracy: United States' Pen;pective, 2008-6 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR ONDERNEMINGSBESTUUR 145.
22. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, CORPORATION LAW§§ 4 .2. 7, 4.2.8 (2000).
23. E.g. , Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 8.60-8.63.
24. E.g. , Mariciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987).
25. E.g ., State ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co .. 64 Wash. 2d 388,
391 P.2d 979 (1964).
26. E.g., Fill Bldgs., Inc. v. Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co., 396 Mich. 453, 241
N.W.2d 466 ( 1976).
27. E.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976l.
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judgment rule, courts generally resolve doubts on fairness against
the conflicted directors. 28
Less clarity exists as to the impact of disinterested director approval of conflict of interest transactions. Most statutes 29 and many
court opinions30 suggest that such approval cures the conflict, so that
any further judicial review of the transaction is under the deferential
business judgment rule as if there was no conflict to begin with.
Other statutes31 and court opinions 32 , however-presumably reflecting a lingering unease with directors dealing with other directorscontinue to call for judicial review of the transaction's fairness. In
any event, this prong forces courts to resolve who is a disinterested
director; which generally entails fact intense scrutiny rather than
categorical rules. 33 Statutes vary as to how many disinterested directors must vote to approve the transaction in order to cure a conflict. 34
The one clear rule for this prong is that directors in a conflict must
disclose all material facts to the disinterested directors. 3 fi
The impact of shareholder approval-but only if there is full disclosure of material facts 36-largely depends upon what sort of
shareholders voted to approve. Approval by shareholders, who themselves are in a conflict of interest, still leaves the court demanding
proof of the transaction's fairness. 37 Approval by shareholders who
have no conflict-at least if they own a majority of the stock38-cures
the conflict and forces the challenging party to prove the transaction
was so undeniably without merit as to amount to a "waste" of corporate assets, which even a majority vote of shareholders cannot save
from attack.39 To establish waste, the plaintiff must show that no
reasonable person would say that the corporation received the
equivalent to what it paid. 4 0
In many instances, such as compensation for senior executives
who are also members ofthe board, the existence of a conflict ofinterest triggering these rules is obvious. When there is no disinterested
approval for the compensation, the court will carefully review
whether the compensation is fair to the corporation and there is a
28. E.g., Lewis v. S.L.& E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764 <2d Cir. 1980l.
29. E.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 8.6l(b)(l), 8.62.
30. E.g., Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114 (Del. 2006).
31. E.g., Calif. Corp. Code§ 310(a)(2).
32. E.g., Cookies Food Products, Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse, Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447
<Iowa 1988).
33. E.g., In re Infousa, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 2007 WL 2419611 mel. Ch.l.
34. Compare Calif. Corp. Code§ 310(a)(2) with Model Bus. Corp. Act §8.62(a).
35. E.g.. Model Bus. Corp. Act§ 8.62(b)(l).
36. E.g .. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 CDel. 2009).
37. E.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 8.6l(b), 8.63(a), (c); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361
A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
38. See text accompanying note 56 inf'ra.
39. E.g., Aronoffv. Albanese, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368 <App. Div. 1982).
40. E.g., Michelson v. Duncan , 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979).
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substantial chance that the court will invalidate the deal. 41 The common practice of gaining approval of compensation by disinterested
directors or shareholders generally triggers the deferential business
judgment rule or waste standard under which it would be extremely
rare for a court to strike down even the large compensation packages
to which senior executives in the United States have grown
accustomed. 4 2
In other sorts of transactions, it may be arguable whether a conflict of interest actually exists. Courts have generally eschewed any
bright line test for determining what constitutes a conflict of interest.43 Even statutes purporting to provide a bright line test, in fact,
provide more of a general standard-largely whether directors, or
parties closely related to the directors, have a financial interest in the
transaction that might reasonably be expected to influence the directors' judgment.4 4

C.

Controlling Shareholders

Shareholders (even those owning a controlling block) generally
have, under prevailing law in the United States, no fiduciary duties
when they act solely in their role as shareholders. 45 Hence, shareholders generally can sell a controlling block of stock at whatever
price they can get46 (except if the sale is to a buyer who, the seller
should know, will loot the corporation 47 ) . Shareholders also are free
to vote their shares to favor their own interests. 48 An exception in
some jurisdictions exists for shareholders in closely held corporations. There, some courts have held that shareholders, even when
voting their stock, have a fiduciary duty toward each other. 4 !}
The situation changes when controlling shareholders go beyond
exercising their power as shareholders and are in a position to use
their influence over the corporation's board of directors. Specifically,
courts may treat a transaction between the corporation and a controlling shareholder as a conflict of interest for the board approving the
transaction. As a result, the court will require the controlling share41. E.g. , Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610 Wei. Ch. 1974).
42. E.g.• In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
43. E.g .. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 34fi (Del. 1993l.
44. E.g., Model Bu;;. Corp. Act § 8.60(1).
45. E.g. , Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996).
46. E.g., Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 48 N.Y. 2d 684, 397 N .E. 2d 387, 421
N.Y.S. 2d 877 (1979 ).
47. E.g. , DeBaun v. First Western Bank & Trust Co., 46 CaL App. 3d 686, 120
Cal. Rptr. 354 (1975).
48. E.g .. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947 l.
49. E.g. , Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 3fi3 N.E .2d 657
(l976 L But see Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 <Del. 1993).
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holder to prove the fairness of the transaction to the corporation and
the minority shareholders.5°
It is not always clear when a shareholder is in a position to control the board for purposes of requiring fairness review of
transactions involving this shareholder. Owning a majority is generally enough for courts to presume control. 51 Finding control below a
majority depends upon the specific facts.5 2 Moreover, some transactions with controlling shareholders-such as a dividend received
proportionately by all shareholders-do not involve a conflict of interest. For such a conflict to exist, the controlling shareholder must
receive something to the exclusion of the minority shareholders and
the corporation.s3
Proof of fairness generally entails the same inquiry into process
(disclosure) and substance, with the burden of proof on the defendant, as is the case with conflict-of-interest transactions generally. 54
One difference is that, so long as the transaction entails fair process
and fair price, some courts may not require a corporate purpose be
served by a transaction in which the majority forces the minority to
sell out their shares. 5 5 The notion of a controlling shareholder seemingly rules out the prospect of curing the conflict through approval by
disinterested directors or shareholders-albeit, approval by a negotiating committee of independent directors or approval by a vote of a
majority of the minority shareholders may help establish the fairness
of the transaction, for instance by shifting the burden of proof to the
plaintiff to show unfairness. 56

II.

ENFORCEMENT

Since, as stated above, directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and the shareholders, enforcement of fiduciary duties falls
largely to actions for recovery by the corporation or the shareholders.
A sufficiently egregious case of breach of fiduciary duty might trigger
a criminal prosecution as a species of theft57; but criminal enforcement of directors' fiduciary duty is rare in the United States. 58
50. E.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
51. E.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 <Del.
1987). But see Beam v. Martha Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).
52. E.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
53. E.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 <Del. 1971).
54. E.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
55. ld. But see Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667,
473 N.E.2d 19 (1984).
56. E.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
57. E.g., Jeffery Bauman eta!, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY. MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 157-58 (5th ed. Supp. 2006) (discussing prosecution of Tyco
CEO, Dennis Kozlowski).
58. Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors' Fiduciary Duty through Legal Liability, 42 Hous. L. Rev. 393. 394 (2005).
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Moreover, shareholders (at)east in a corporation with more than a
few shareholders59) may only bring an action to recover in their own
right when the breach of fiduciary duty causes them direct harm,
rather then lowering the value of their shares through harm to the
corporation. 60 What this means is that the ty-pical claim for breach of
fiduciary duty-outside of the merger .and acquisition context in
which disappointed shareholders often are able to bring class actions
for direct harm-is an action for recovery by the corporation. This
creates an obvious problem if directors or controlling shareholders
end up deciding whether the company will enforce its claim. The solution in U.S. law is to allow individual shareholders to bring what is
called a derivative lawsuit for recovery by the corporation.
Standing requirements to bring a derivative lawsuit in the
United States are rather liberal. There is no minimum amount of
shares which the plaintiff(s) must own. The plaintiff must be a shareholder throughout the lawsuit and must meet a bare bones notion of
being an adequate representative by not pursuing some too obvious
personal agenda.61 Being a front for an attorney who brings the suit
for the fees, however, is normal and acceptable. 62 On the other hand,
to prevent persons from buying stock to bring lawsuits, most states
require the plaintiff to have been a shareholder at the time of the
wrongdoing.63
Derivative suits strip away the power of the board to decide
whether the corporation will bring a lawsuit. They also expose the
corporation to expense. For example, if the directors prevail, or even
settle, the corporation may end up paying the directors' considerable
attorney fees. 64 For this reason, a key screening device imposed upon
derivative suits is the rule requiring that the plaintiff plead with particularity either a reason why the court should ignore the directors'
rejection of the plaintiffs demand that they take action to remedy the
breach,65 or an acceptable excuse for not making such a demand. 66 In
most jurisdictions, an acceptable excuse is that demand would be futile, essentially because we know already that the court will ignore
the directors' rejection of a demand. 67 As a first approximation, the
plaintiff accomplishes this by pleading that most of the directors have
breached their duty, or are under the control of a party (such as a
59. See, e.g., Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W.2d 793 (N,D. 1991) (allowing
shareholder to sue in own right for damage to a closely held corporation).
60. E.g., Sax v. World Wide Press, Inc., 809 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1987).
61. E.g., Model Business Corp. Act§ 7.41.
62. E.g., Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1982).
63. E.g., Model Business Corp. Act§ 7.41(a).
64. E.g., Model Business ·Corp. Act§§ 8.51, 8.52.
65. E.g., Model Business Corp. Act§ 7.44(c).
66. E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
67. E.g., Marx v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189, 644 N.Y.S.2d 121, 666 N.E.2d 1034 (1996).
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controlling shareholder) who has breached a duty. 68 Normal pleading
rules in the United States could allow the plaintiff to accomplish this
goal with conclusory statements, which would render the demand
rule toothless. The bite in the rule comes from the requirement that
the plaintiff plead with particularity-meaning the plaintiff must
make detailed allegations of wrongdoing against most of the board
members or detailed allegations that establish control by the wrongdoer over most of the directors. 69 In essence, the rule serves as a
mechanism to test whether there are specific facts to support the
plaintiff's claim b.efore the corporation is put the expense of discovery
(through which, ~owever, the plaintiff might learn of such facts).
Under the demand rule, the court may excuse demand even
though the complaint does not implicate every member of the board
(perhaps because some members joined after the challenged transaction occurred). Corporations have responded by creating so-called
special litigation committees consisting of non-defendant directors to
whom the board delegates the power to decide if the corporation
should pursue. the lawsuit against the majority of directors. Courts
have differed in dealing with motions by these committees seeking to
dismiss derivative suits. Some have given the committee the benefit
of the business judgment rule. 70 Others, led by Delaware, 71 have
used this as an occasion for the court to determine whether the suit is
in the corporation's interest. One state has rejected the whole idea of
directors, precluded from deciding ifthe corporation should sue, nevertheless having the power to pick the persons to make this
decision. 7 2
Because derivative suit plaintiffs often own only a few shares,
there is a great potential for collusive settlements; which is ameliorated, but not eliminated, by the requirement that the court approve
any settlement. 73 Otherwise, the motive for shareholders with few
shares bringing suit lies in the prospect for attorneys fees, which the
court will award ifthere is a recovery (even a non-monetary recovery)
for the corporation. 74 In essence, the system is one of attorneys acting
as bounty hunters to police corporate directors.

Jd·
E.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
.
70. E.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 N.E.2d 994
(1979).
71. E.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
72. Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983).
73. E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
,
74: E.g., Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn 362, 101 N.W.2d
423 (1960).
'

